2026, 39(3): 123-140

杠杆操纵与企业研发投入:融资纾困还是管理防御

Leverage Manipulation and Enterprise R&D Investment: Financing Rescue or Managerial Entrenchment


DOI:10.3969/j.issn.1672-0334.2026.03.008

中国分类号:F275.5; F273.1


作者:

林炳洪 福建农林大学 经济与管理学院,福州 350002

李秉祥 西安理工大学 经济与管理学院,西安 710054

张 涛 甘肃政法大学 商学院,兰州 730070


基金项目:国家自然科学基金 (71772151);福建省社会科学基金 (FJ2026C143);福州市社会科学规划项目 (2026FZC143)


中文摘要:

财务杠杆如何影响研发投入一直是公司财务与企业创新领域关注的重点。杠杆操纵将现存债务隐藏起来,此举虽然有助于降低账面杠杆率,增强企业融资能力,纾解研发活动过程中的融资约束困境;但也会降低债务信息透明度,削弱负债相机治理有效性,强化管理层管理防御动机,使其刻意规避风险,缩减研发投入。因此,杠杆操纵对企业研发投入可能存在两种相反效应,值得深入研究。采用基本的XLT-LEVM法下的预期模型法估计企业杠杆操纵程度,通过融资纾困与管理防御的竞争性假设理论分析并实证检验杠杆操纵对企业研发投入的影响。在明确二者关系的基础上,从资源配置渠道和风险叠加渠道探索杠杆操纵影响企业研发投入的具体作用机制,同时进一步检验不同形式的监督和激励的治理有效性。研究结果表明,杠杆操纵会抑制企业加大研发投入,验证了杠杆操纵具有管理防御效应,而非融资纾困效应。具体的作用渠道检验发现,杠杆操纵主要通过资源配置渠道的加剧资源错配和风险叠加渠道的增大债务违约风险,进而抑制企业加大研发投入。异质性分析结果表明,在民营企业、高新技术企业以及处于市场化程度较低地区的企业中,杠杆操纵对企业研发投入的抑制作用强度更大。进一步的治理机制检验发现,监督机制通过提高独立董事比例与聘任国际“四大”审计可以有效缓解杠杆操作对企业研发投入的抑制作用;而激励机制的股权激励和薪酬激励治理效应并不显著,未能减弱杠杆操纵对企业研发投入的抑制作用,表明监督机制比激励机制更能纠偏管理层管理防御倾向,抑制其杠杆操纵行为,促进企业加大研发投入。研究结果不仅有效拓展了杠杆操纵在企业创新领域的经济后果,同时该结果也有助于澄清杠杆操纵对企业研发投入的实质性影响,为进一步从杠杆视角研究企业创新提供有益参考。

关键词:杠杆操纵;研发投入;资源错配;债务违约风险;管理防御


英文摘要:

How financial leverage affects R&D investment has long been a focus of attention in the field of corporate finance and enterprise innovation. Leverage manipulation hides existing debt, which helps to reduce book leverage, enhance corporate financing capabilities, and alleviate financing constraints in the process of R&D activities. However, it can also reduce the transparency of debt information, weaken the effectiveness of debt contingent governance, strengthen the managerial entrenchment motivation, and deliberately avoid risks to reduce R&D investment. Therefore, leverage manipulation may have two opposite effects on enterprise R&D investment, which is worth conducting in-depth research on. The expected model method under the basic XLT-LEVM method was used to estimate the degree of corporate leverage manipulation, and the competitive hypothesis of “financing rescue” and “managerial entrenchment” was employed to analyze and empirically test the impact of leverage manipulation on enterprise R&D investment. On the basis of clarifying the relationship between the two, explore the specific mechanism of leverage manipulation affecting enterprise R&D investment from the perspective of resource allocation and risk superposition, and further test the governance effectiveness of different forms of supervision and incentive methods. The research results show that leverage manipulation can inhibit enterprises from increasing R&D investment, verifying the managerial entrenchment effect of leverage manipulation rather than the financing rescue effect. The specific channel test found that leverage manipulation mainly exacerbates resource mismatch through resource allocation channel and increases the risk of debt default through risk superposition channel to suppress enterprises from increasing R&D investment. The heterogeneity analysis results indicate that leverage manipulation has a greater inhibitory effect on R&D investment in private enterprises, high-tech enterprises, and enterprises located in areas with lower marketization. Further governance mechanism tests show that the supervision mechanism can effectively alleviate the inhibition of leverage manipulation on enterprise R&D investment by increasing the proportion of independent directors and employing international “Big Four” auditors. However, the governance effect of equity incentive and salary incentive of incentive mechanism is not significant, which fails to weaken the inhibition of leverage manipulation on enterprise R&D investment, indicating that the supervision mechanism is more capable of correcting the managerial entrenchment tendency than the incentive mechanism, restraining their leverage manipulation behavior, and promoting enterprises to increase R&D investment. The research conclusion not only effectively expands the economic consequences of leverage manipulation in the field of enterprise innovation, but also helps clarify the substantive impact of leverage manipulation on enterprise R&D investment, providing useful references for further research on corporate innovation from the perspective of leverage.

Key words: leverage manipulation|R&D investment|resource mismatch|debt default risk|managerial entrenchment