2026, 39(3): 87-103

合规管理对企业风险承担的影响研究

Impact of Compliance Management on Risk-Taking in Central State-Owned Enterprises

DOI：10.3969/j.issn.1672-0334.2026.03.006

中国分类号：F275; F272.3

作者：

闫珍丽 上海对外经贸大学 会计学院，上海 201620

赵晓梅 中国再保险 (集团) 股份有限公司 气候风险研究中心，北京 100033

梁上坤 中央财经大学 会计学院，北京 100081

基金项目：国家社会科学基金 (24CJY132)

中文摘要：

政府介入公司治理可能带来资源获取优势，也可能引致目标多元化并降低决策效率。2018年国务院国资委发布《中央企业合规管理指引(试行)》，要求中央企业系统推进合规体系建设，设立合规委员会、制定合规手册、建立合规报告制度并强化考核问责。作为外部监管嵌入企业内部治理的重要制度安排，该政策可能通过监督和惩罚机制改变企业风险偏好，但其对企业风险承担的影响仍缺乏系统性证据。聚焦合规管理对企业风险承担的影响，基于合规管理分阶段推进的制度背景，手工整理上市企业合规管理信息，构建多时期双重差分模型进行识别；以集团层面推进合规管理的中央企业为处理组，以未推进合规管理的中央企业和地方国企为对照组，样本覆盖2014年至2023年A股上市企业。进一步区分合规手册颁布与合规委员会成立两类制度工具，并开展动态检验、安慰剂检验等稳健性分析；同时从经营效率、供应链韧性和非效率投资等角度检验作用机制，并考察行业与管理层特征下的异质性。结果表明，合规管理显著降低中央企业风险承担；合规手册颁布和合规委员会成立均具有显著的风险抑制效应。机制检验表明，合规管理主要通过提升企业经营效率、增强供应链韧性和抑制非效率投资等渠道降低风险承担。由异质性分析结果可知，在行业竞争程度更低以及管理层风险偏好更强的情形下，合规管理的风险抑制作用更为突出。进一步分析表明，合规管理伴随更好的ESG表现、更低的财务杠杆和过度投资倾向，并且能够改善公司绩效。从政府强制合规制度的视角提供了合规管理影响企业风险承担的经验证据，有助于理解外部监管 − 内部治理协同机制的经济后果。政策层面，应推动合规委员会和合规手册等制度工具实质化运行，将合规要求嵌入重点领域业务流程，并在监管强度与企业执行成本之间把握合理边界，促进企业由形式合规走向实质合规，从而更好地服务于风险防控和高质量发展。

关键词：合规管理；风险承担；合规委员会；合规手册

英文摘要：

Government involvement in corporate governance can bring advantages in financing and resource access, but it may also create multiple objectives and weaken decision-making efficiency. In this context, the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council (SASAC) issued the Interim Guidelines on Compliance Management for Central Enterprises in 2018. The Guidelines require central state-owned enterprises (central SOEs) to systematically build compliance systems by establishing compliance committees, developing and distributing compliance manuals, setting up compliance reporting mechanisms, and strengthening evaluation and accountability. By embedding external regulation into internal governance, this government-mandated compliance regime can reshape firms′ risk preferences through intensified monitoring and sanctions. Yet evidence on whether and how compliance management affects corporate risk-taking remains limited. This study investigates how compliance management affects corporate risk-taking in central SOEs. Leveraging the phased rollout of compliance initiatives, we munually hand-collect firm-level data on listed companies′ compliance management and employ a multi-period difference-in-differences (DID) design. The treatment group comprises listed central SOEs whose parent groups have implemented compliance management, while the control group includes central SOEs without such implementation as well as local state-owned enterprises (local SOEs). The sample covers A-share listed firms from 2014 to 2023. To better capture the institutional content of compliance management, this study distinguishes two key group-level instruments—issuance of compliance manuals and establishment of compliance committees—and estimate their respective effects on corporate risk-taking. This study further bolsters identification with a battery of robustness checks, including dynamic (event-study) specifications and placebo tests. Beyond the baseline estimates, it explores potential mechanisms by examining operating efficiency, supply chain resilience, and inefficient investment, and assesses heterogeneity across industry and managerial characteristics, with particular attention to industry competition intensity and managerial risk preference. The results indicate that compliance management significantly reduces corporate risk-taking among central SOEs. This effect is not driven by a single component: Both compliance manual issuance and compliance committee establishment are associated with statistically and economically meaningful declines in risk-taking. Mechanism analyses suggest that compliance construction curbs risk-taking mainly by improving operating efficiency, enhancing supply chain resilience, and restraining inefficient investment, consistent with the view that stronger compliance governance tightens decision boundaries and limits opportunistic, high-risk actions. Heterogeneity tests show larger effects in less competitive industries and in firms led by managers with stronger risk preferences, implying that compliance governance is particularly disciplining when external competitive pressure is weaker and internal risk appetite is higher. Additional evidence links compliance management to better ESG performance, lower financial leverage, and reduced overinvestment, alongside improved firm performance. Overall, this study provides empirical evidence that government-mandated compliance governance meaningfully shapes corporate risk behavior in central SOEs, thereby helping to clarify the economic consequences of the “external regulation–internal governance” synergy. From a policy perspective, regulators and SOE groups should promote the substantive operation of compliance committees and compliance manuals, embed compliance requirements and control measures into key business processes in high-risk areas, and calibrate regulatory intensity against firms′ implementation costs. Such a balanced approach can prevent symbolic compliance, encourage substantive compliance management, and better support risk prevention and high-quality development.

Key words: compliance management|risk-taking|compliance committee|compliance manual