朱健齊,李天成,孟繁邨,翁胤哲,等.海峡两岸独立董事设置对企业绩效的影响——基于政策实施的视角[J].管理科学,2017,30(4):17-29
海峡两岸独立董事设置对企业绩效的影响——基于政策实施的视角
Influence Independent Director Setting of Mainland China and Taiwan of P.R.China on Corporation Performance: From the Perspective of Policy Implementation
投稿时间:2017-02-28  修订日期:2017-06-17
DOI:10.3969/j.issn.1672-0334.2017.04.002
中文关键词:  独立董事  政策  法规强制设置  企业绩效  海峡两岸
英文关键词:independent directors  policy  mandatory implementation of regulations  corporate performance  Mainland China and Taiwan of P.R.China
基金项目:国家自然科学基金(71532004);汕头大学人文科研启动经费(STF14003);汕头大学粤台企业合作研究院重大基金
作者单位E-mail
朱健齊 汕头大学 商学院广东 汕头515063 1445730799@qq.com 
李天成 华南农业大学 经济管理学院广州510642 lycmfc@163.com 
孟繁邨 华南农业大学 经济管理学院广州 510642 mfc_105@163.com 
翁胤哲 哈尔滨工业大学 管理学院哈尔滨 150001 ycw@hit.edu.cn 
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中文摘要:
       董事会作为上市公司监督和决策的重要机构,其独立性至关重要。为了加强内部监管,规避大股东内部控制导致的对中小股东的利益侵占,独立董事制度已经成为不同公司治理模式的共同取向。独立董事制度能否以及如何提升企业绩效一直是学术界争论的焦点,也是近年来以独立董事制度取代原有公司监察人和监事会制度所积极深入剖析的主要课题,因此有必要进一步探讨董事会独立性的作用。
       政策的推行依赖社会制度和法制环境,海峡两岸面临不同的社会制度以及处于不同法制和金融环境。从推行独立董事这一政策视角入手,选取2002年至2015年中国大陆965家上市公司和2002年至2006年台湾地区1 102家上市公司为样本,运用独立样本t检验、多元线性回归模型和分段回归模型,研究强制设置独立董事的政策对企业绩效的影响,并就海峡两岸间的差异进行对比。
       研究结果表明,①强制推行独立董事制度在海峡两岸均会提升上市公司的绩效,但台湾地区受政策影响的企业绩效提升作用更明显;海峡两岸在证券市场的成熟度、监管和信息披露的有效性以及公司治理的代理问题等方面存在差异,中国大陆虚设独立董事的现象影响了其企业绩效的提升。②按照上市公司独立董事人数是否符合证监会规定进行分组,对比分析后发现,中国大陆强制设置独立董事的制度推行后,独立董事比例低于国家法规强制设置比例的上市公司,增加独立董事人数会对其资产报酬率有提升作用。
       董事会独立性作为公司治理研究的拓展,具有重要的理论意义和现实意义。研究结果为理解和评估中国推进上市公司独立董事制度改革的政策效果提供新视角和新证据,海峡两岸间的对比为英美公司治理制度全盘移植于新兴市场提供参考。研究结果对支持法规强制设置独立董事政策有积极支持作用,海峡两岸公司治理制度在双轨制与委员会制度并存之际,此研究对许多尚未探讨的制度性选择问题有一定的借鉴意义。
英文摘要:
       The board of directors plays an important role in the supervision and decision-making, and its independence is vital to listed companies. In order to strengthen the internal supervision and to avoid the expropriation of the interests of small and medium shareholders, independent directors setting has become the common choice even among the different corporate governance models. In academia, whether independent directors can promote corporate performance and how to improve is not only the focus of many studies, but also the main issues of the countries with civil law system, whose setting aims to replace the original institutions——company auditors and the board of supervisors. Therefore, it is of significance to further explore the influences of independent directors.
       However, the implementation of policies relies on social systems and legal environment, and Mainland China and Taiwan of P.R.China have different social systems, legal systems and financial environment. From the perspective of the promotion of independent directors, 965 listed companies in Mainland China(2002-2015) and 1102 listed companies in Taiwan of P.R.China (2002-2006) are selected as samples. This study applies the independent-samples T test, multiple linear regression and segmented regression to study the impact of the mandatory implementation of independent director policies on corporate performance, and to compare the differences of the two regions′ impact of policies.
       This study shows that ① the mandatory implementation of independent director policies promotes the corporate performance in sample companies both in Mainland China and Taiwan of P.R.China, while it is more significant in Taiwan of P.R.China. Many differences exist in the field of securities market, the effectiveness of supervision and information disclosure, and the agency problem. And in Mainland China, the phenomenon of fictitious independent directors negatively affects corporate performance. ② Listed companies are grouped by the number of independent directors (whether it is in compliance with the provisions of China Securities Regulatory Commission). Given this background, we find that since listed companies are mandatory to set independent directors in Mainland China, it shows that increasing the number of independent directors can positively affect the return on assets, but only occurs in those companies whose independent directors′ proportion is lower than that of the mandatory proportion.
       The study of independent directors as an extension of corporate governance researches has theoretical and realistic significance. This study provides new perspectives and evidences for the understanding and evaluation of the mandatory implementation of independent directors in Mainland China. The comparison between the different impacts of the policies in the Mainland China and Taiwan of P.R.China provides references to the transplantation of Anglo-American′s corporate governance system to emerging markets. Furthermore, the result and extension generate positive support for mandatory implementation of independent director policies and offer references to upcoming institutional selection problems, especially during the co-existence of dual track system and committee system in corporate governance.
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