王文姣,夏常源,傅代国,何娜,等.独立董事网络、信息双向传递与公司被诉风险[J].管理科学,2017,30(4):63-82
独立董事网络、信息双向传递与公司被诉风险
Independent Directors′ Network, Bidirectional Information Transmission and Corporate Litigation Risk
投稿时间:2017-02-19  修订日期:2017-06-22
DOI:10.3969/j.issn.1672-0334.2017.04.005
中文关键词:  独立董事网络  被诉风险  信息双向传递  内部控制  环境不确定性
英文关键词:independent directors′ network  litigation risk  bidirectional information transmission  internal control  environmental uncertainty
基金项目:中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金(JBK1507124,JBK1507181)
作者单位E-mail
王文姣 西南财经大学 会计学院成都 611130 cannon_wang0515@163.com 
夏常源 西南财经大学 保险学院成都 611130 xiachangyuan21@126.com 
傅代国 西南财经大学 会计学院成都 611130 fdg@swufe.edu.cn 
何娜 西南财经大学 会计学院成都 611130 hena6_16@126.com 
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中文摘要:
       近年来频繁发生的诉讼案件威胁公司内外部“和谐”,引发各界关注。一般认为,信息不对称是引发公司诉讼风险的重要原因。一方面,外部利益相关者对公司内部信息不了解,使经理人机会主义行为更易发生;而且,外部利益相关者与公司间的信息偏误,也会造成日后纠纷,这些都可能引发公司被诉风险。另一方面,公司经理人掌握的外部信息不充分,使其在环境不确定性下的各项决策面临更高的失败风险,极易引发由决策失败导致的被诉风险。因此,研究如何缓解公司内外部间的信息不对称、规避公司被诉风险具有重要的理论价值和实践意义。
       基于嵌入性和公司内外部间信息双向传递的视角,考察独立董事网络对公司被诉风险的影响及其作用机理。以2007年至2014年中国A股上市公司为研究对象,构建独立董事网络-信息双向传递-公司被诉风险理论分析框架,运用Stata 13.0软件进行多元回归分析、PSM分析和工具变量回归分析,实证检验独立董事网络对公司被诉风险的影响,并结合内部控制有效性和环境不确定性探讨这一影响的具体作用机理,最后对研究中涉及的内生性问题进行检验。
       研究结果表明,独立董事网络有助于公司内外部间的信息双向传递,降低公司被诉风险。对作用机理的检验结果表明,在内部控制不健全、环境不确定性较高的公司中,独立董事网络抑制被诉风险的效应更加明显,说明独立董事网络既可以将公司内部信息向外部传递,缓解经理人机会主义行为和公司内外部间信息偏误,也可以将外部信息向公司内部传递,提升经理人决策科学性。而且,独立董事网络并未强化独立董事监督职能,而是通过信息传递增强证券分析师和机构投资者等外部监督,改善了公司信息环境。稳健性检验结果表明,在考虑替代变量、独立董事自选择偏差、内生性等问题之后结论依然稳健。
       研究结果有助于丰富和完善社会网络与公司治理和诉讼风险成因的研究,也为中国上市公司认识和规避当前被诉风险提供一些有益的现实启示。
英文摘要:
       With the increasing litigation cases of listed companies in recent years in China, which threaten the companies′ internal and external relationships, there is a growing academic interest in how to avoid litigation risk. Information asymmetry is generally believed an important cause of litigation risk. On the one hand, external stakeholders don′t know about the internal information of companies, and this makes it easy for managers to do opportunistic behaviors. In addition, information bias between the external stakeholders and managers causes the disputes in the future. These reasons may trigger the litigation risk of companies. On the other hand, as managers don′t know about external information adequately, there may exist the possibility for managers to make a wrong decision in an uncertain environment and trigger the litigation risk of companies similarly. Therefore, it has theoretical and practical importance to alleviate information asymmetry between the inside and outside of companies and help the companies avoid the litigation risk.
       From the perspective of embeddedness and bidirectional information transmission, this paper investigates the impact of independent directors′ network on corporate litigation risk and the mechanism. Taking the listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share market during 2007 to 2014 as samples, this paper establishes a theoretical framework of independent directors′ network-bidirectional information transmission-litigation risk, and uses the software of Stata 13.0, multiple regression method, PSM method and instrumental variable regression analysis to empirically test for the role of independent directors′ network in litigation risk. This paper also examines detailed mechanisms of the effect of independent directors' network on litigation risk with internal control effectiveness and environmental uncertainty and tests for endogeneity.
       The empirical results show that independent directors′ network contributes to transmit information between the inside and outside of companies bilaterally, and alleviate companies′ information asymmetry. Through the further test of the mechanism, we find the negative effect of independent directors′ network on litigation risk is more significant in the companies with unsound internal control and high environmental uncertainty. It means independent directors′ network not only transmits the internal information of companies to the external shareholders and alleviates managers′ opportunistic behaviors and information bias but also transmits the external information to companies and makes managers′ decisions more scientific. Furthermore, this paper finds that the information transmission function of independent directors′ network strengthens the external supervision of securities analysts and institutional investors rather than strengthens the supervisory function of independent directors to improve the environment of corporate governance. The robustness tests show that the conclusions are robustness after considering the alternative measurements of key variables, self-selection bias and endogenous problems.
       The findings contribute to enrich the academic literature on the causes of litigation risk, social network and corporate governance, and provide some reality enlightenment for companies to recognize and avoid the litigation risk.
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