蔡春,唐凯桃,薛小荣.会计专业独董的兼职席位、事务所经历与真实盈余管理[J].管理科学,2017,30(4):30-47
会计专业独董的兼职席位、事务所经历与真实盈余管理
Directorships of Independent Directors with Accounting Expertise, Audit Experience and Real Earnings Management
投稿时间:2017-02-18  修订日期:2017-06-23
DOI:10.3969/j.issn.1672-0334.2017.04.003
中文关键词:  会计专业独董  真实盈余管理  产权性质  股权集中度  事务所关联
英文关键词:independent directors with accounting expertise  real earnings management  property right  ownership concentration  affiliation relationship
基金项目:国家自然科学基金(71272246)
作者单位E-mail
蔡春 西南财经大学 会计学院成都 611130 c_cai@swufe.edu.cn 
唐凯桃 重庆三峡银行 资金运营总部重庆 430000 tangkaitao@yeah.net 
薛小荣 西安财经学院 中国(西安)丝绸之路研究院西安710002 rxx369@126.com 
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中文摘要:
       自独立董事制度确立以来,理论界和实务界都非常关注独立董事个体特征在完善公司治理中扮演的重要角色。鉴于独立董事多席位的现象在中国资本市场中普遍存在,以及具有事务所经历的专业人士已成为上市公司选聘会计专业独董的重要来源,考察会计专业独董的兼职席位和事务所经历特征在公司治理中的作用具有重要的理论价值和现实意义。
       以2009年至2014年中国A股上市公司为研究样本,采用STATA软件以及控制行业和年度固定效应的OLS回归分析方法,结合独立董事的声誉假说,探讨会计专业独董的兼职席位、事务所经历会计专业独董的兼职席位与企业真实盈余管理行为之间的关系。在此基础上,进一步分析产权性质、股权集中度和事务所关联等因素对上述关系的影响。
       实证结果表明,会计专业独董兼职席位数越多,其所在公司的真实盈余管理程度越低,当具有事务所经历的会计专业独董兼职席位越多时,公司真实盈余管理程度进一步降低;进一步分析还发现,当公司产权性质为非国有企业、股权集中度较低以及事务所经历会计专业独董与公司所聘任的主审会计师事务所不存在关联关系时,事务所经历会计专业独董的兼职席位对真实盈余管理行为的抑制作用更加明显。
       研究结论不仅验证了独立董事的声誉假说,还发现产权性质、股权集中度和事务所关联等因素会影响会计专业独董有效履职,拓展了独立董事个体特征和真实盈余管理的相关经验研究;同时,研究结论还为监管层完善监管机制、上市公司会计专业独董的选聘和主审会计师事务所的聘用提供决策参考依据。
英文摘要:
       Since the establishment of the independent director institution in China, academic researchers and industry practitioners pay close attention to the important role of independent directors in corporate governance. Given that directorships of independent directors is a widespread phenomenon in Chinese capital market, and that professional staff with audit firm experience have been the main source of independent directors with accounting expertise, it is of great theoretical value and practical significance to study the role of independent directors with accounting expertise and with audit firm experience in corporate governance.
       By selecting Chinese A-share listed companies from 2009 to 2014 as samples, using STATA software and OLS regression analysis method for controlling industry and annual fixed effect, combining the reputation hypothesis of the independent director, this paper analyzes the relationship between the directorships of independent directors with accounting expertise as well as the directorships of independent directors with audit firm experience and real earnings management. To elaborate, we further discuss the influence that corporate property rights, ownership concentration and the affiliation relationship between independent directors with audit experience and accounting firms have on the relationship aforementioned.
       The results of this paper show that the directorships of independent directors with accounting expertise and the level of real earnings management share a negative relationship. Furthermore, the increasing directorships of independent directors with audit firm experience result in the reduction of real earnings management level. Upon closer investigation, such relationship between the directorships of independent directors with audit firm experience and corporate′s real earnings management is more observable on condition that, in addition to non-state-own-enterprises and enterprises with lower level of ownership concentration, there is a non-affiliation-relationship between independent directors with audit experience and accounting firms.
       This research results not only support the reputation hypothesis of the independent director, but also find that corporate property rights, ownership concentration and affiliation relationship will influence the performance of independent directors′ directorships. Therefore, this paper enriches the related literature for the individual characteristics of independent directors and corporate′s real earnings management. The research results can also provide some advice for the concerned regulators with regard to promoting regulations, appointing independent directors with accounting expertise, and employing the corporate′s auditing firm.
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